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ENJOY THE DONUT: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
WHITE PAPER ON PREVENTING INVASION
OF THE GREAT LAKES BY EXOTIC SPECIES
SandraB. Zellmer*
"The success of technology-based standards in abating toxic water pollution
depends largely on one'spredispositionto enjoy the donut or regret the hole."'
INTRODUCTION
The adverse economic and environmental consequences associated with the
invasion and establishment of exotic species have raised significant concerns
among the Great Lakes community. In September 1999, the International Joint
Commission (IJC) hosted a workshop on exotic policy, drawing upon the
expertise of biologists, lawyers and public officials, to consider means of
preventing exotic species invasions. The White Paper on Policies for the
Prevention of the Invasion of the GreatLakes by Exotic Organisms2 served as the
centerpiece for discussion at the workshop.
The White Paper concludes that economic initiatives, such as subsidies or
taxation, would be the most viable way to prevent introductions through ballast
water, a primary means for invasion by exotic species in the Great Lakes. This
article suggests instead that regulation under the Clean Water Act (CWA) is an
effective solution, at least with respect to ships traversing United States waters. 3
Not only is federal regulation required under the plain language of the CWA, it
* Professor Sandra Zellmer, LL.M - George Washington National Law Center, JD - Univ. of
South Dakota, BS - Momingside College. Professor Zellmer teaches environmental law courses at
the University of Toledo College of Law and is a faculty member of the Legal Institute of the Great
Lakes. The author would like to thank the College of Law and the Legal Institute for their support,
Eric Reeves for the invitation to the International Joint Commission workshop on exotic species,
Dom Carlson, U.S. EPA, Brent Foster, and Drs. Robert Sinsabaugh and Daryl Moorehead for their
input. The assistance of Carolyn Salzmann, JD Candidate, University of Toledo College of Law
Class, is also acknowledged with gratitude.
1. Oliver A. Houck, Clean Water Act and Related Programs, CA37 ALI-ABA 295, 310

(1996).
2. Eric Reeves, White Paperon Policiesfor the Prevention of the Invasion ofthe Great Lakes

by Exotic Organisms (July 15, 1999). Where possible, cites are also provided to Eric Reeves'
revised document published in this symposium issue, Exotic Politics: An Analysis of The
Economics, Law, and Politicsof Exotic Invasions of The GreatLakes, 2 TOL. J. GREAT LAKES' L.,
SC. & POLY 125 (Fall 1999).

3. As aquatic species do not respect political boundaries, introductions through ballast water
on the Canadian side of the border can have serious effects in the United States. This article,
however, is limited to an assessment of U.S. domestic law, in particular, the Clean Water Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq., as well as the U.S.-Canada Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.
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could most expediently address the invasion of exotics through ballast water
discharges.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, has issued a
regulatory exclusion for "incidental" ballast water discharges. This exclusion,
which has been challenged by a coalition of environmental groups, finds no
support in the statute. Under the CWA, contaminated ballast discharges from
vessels are prohibited as "discharges of pollutants" from point sources, unless a
permit is obtained. Ballast water discharge permits would incorporate effluent
limitations reflecting the best technology available, a marked improvement over
the status quo. Once a threshold level of treatment is established by the CWA,
perhaps economic initiatives could provide additional incentives for compliance
and technological innovation.
To put the issues in context, this article will first provide background regarding
the effects of exotic species introduced into the Great Lakes through ballast water
as well as current legal controls. It will then turn, in Section II, to the relevant
sections of the CWA and the federal regulations. Section III explains the
advantages of a regulatory permit system, particularly in comparison to economic
approaches. Finally, Section IV assesses the practical implications of
implementing the CWA permit system to control ballast water discharges.
I. EXOTIC SPECIES DISCHARGED WITH BALLAST WATER:
EFFECTS AND CURRENT CONTROL EFFORTS
Exotic species have taken a heavy toll on United States' ecosystems. The
White Paper and numerous other scientific and legal publications provide
detailed assessments of the adverse consequences of exotic species' invasions in
the Great Lakes, particularly those resulting from ballast discharges. 4 To set the
stage for the discussion of regulatory options, this article will outline some of the
more serious effects.
The rate of invasion by exotic species "poses an increasing global threat to
native biodiversity, ranked second only to habitat loss." 5 Exotic species have
made a significant contribution to the decline of indigenous species in the Great
Lakes.6 The sea lamprey, for example, depredates directly on native fish, such as

4. See Reeves, White Paper,supra note 2, at 6-13. See also Interim Rule, Implementation of
the National Invasive Species Act of 1996, 64 Fed. Reg. 26672, 26673 (1999) ("aquatic nuisance
species invasions through ballast water are now recognized as a serious problem threatening global
biological diversity and human health").
5. John J. Ewel, et al., DeliberateIntroductions of Species: Research Needs, 49 BIOSCIENCE
619, 620 (1999). See 64 Fed. Reg. at 26673. See also David S. Wilcove, et al., Quantifying
Threats to Imperiled Species in the United States, 48 BtOSCIENCE 607-15 (1998) (stating that
exotics pose a serious threat to native species listed as federally endangered or threatened).
6. See Proposed Water Quality Guidance for the Great Lakes System, 58 Fed. Reg. 20802,
20807 (1993). Native fisheries have also been adversely affected by over-fishing, pollution, and
habitat destruction. See id.
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lake trout, walleye and whitefish.7 Other exotic species affect Great Lakes'
fisheries by competing for food and habitat, and by introducing disease
and parasites.
Exotic species also cause a variety of economic harms. Declining fisheries are
but one source of loss. The highly fecund zebra mussel (Dreissenapolymorpha)
is estimated to cost between $3 to $5 billion a year nationwide, in large part due
to the expenses incurred by power plants to clear and maintain clogged intake
pipes. 9 Total losses caused by fifteen selected nonindigenous aquatic species,
including zebra mussel and the purple loosestrife plant (Lythrum salicaria),have

been estimated at over $134 billion.'0

Ballast water is one of the primary vectors for the introduction of exotic
species into Great Lakes waters." Vessels generally pump ballast water into
tanks to replace the weight of off-loaded cargo or expended fuel, thereby
improving vessel stability in transport.12 The zebra mussel is perhaps the most
well-publicized of the invaders attributed to ballast water discharges. Others
include the Eurasian ruffe (Gymnocephalus cernuus),13 the spiny water flea
(Bythotre4phes cederstroemi), and even human bacterial pathogens such as
cholera.'

The discharge of ballast from commercial ships was virtually unregulated until
the early 1990's, when regulations were issued pursuant to the Nonindigenous

Aquatic Nuisance Prevention and Control Act of 1990 (NANPCA) 5, as amended

7. See Great Lakes Fishery Commission, Sea Lamprey Control, (visited Dec. 20, 1999)
<http://www.glfc.org/lampcon.htm>.
8. See Eric Reeves, Analysis of Laws & Policies ConcerningExotic Invasions of the Great
Lakes: A Report to the Michigan Department ofEnvironmental Quality at 8-9 (Mar. 15, 1999) (on
file with author); Glenn Zorpette, Mussel Mayhem Continued: Apparent Benefits of Zebra Mussel
PlagueAre Anything But, 275 SCI. AM. 2: 22-23 (August 1996).
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 4701(4). The zebra mussel attaches to water pipes, thereby restricting
water flow for cooling and increasing sedimentation and corrosion, resulting in significant
maintenance, plant redesign, and shut-down expenses. See Zorpette, supra note 8, at 22-23;
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, HARMFUL NON-INDIGENOUS SPECIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 67 (1993).
10. See Sharonne O'Shea & Allegra Cangelosi, Trojan Horses in Our Harbors:Biological
Contaminationfrom Ballast Water Discharge,27 U. Tol. L. Rev. 381, 382-85 (1996); OFFICE OF
TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supranote 9, at 6.
11. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL MARINE BOARD, STEMMING THE TIDE:
CONTROLLING INTRODUCTIONS OF NONINDIGENOUS SPECIES BY SHIP'S BALLAST WATER
11(1996).
12. See id. at 22.
13. The Eurasian ruffe, which has become one of the most abundant fish of Lake Superior's
harbors, eats the forage of native species. See 142 CONG. REC. H10925 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1996)
(Statement of Rep. Oberstar). If the ruffe is not controlled, the Great Lakes Fishery Commission
estimates that it could cause annual losses exceeding $90 million. See David Eldridge, Leviathan
Lurks: Might The NationalInvasive Species Act of 1996 Actually Authorize Invasion by Proscribed
Species?, 6 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 47,47 n.6 (1997).
14. See International Maritime Organization Ballast Water Control Guidelines, 56 Fed. Reg.
64831, 64831 (Dec. 12, 1991); O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 10, at 383-84 and n.3, 20-22 (1996)
(citing, inter alia, Edward L. Mills et al., Exotic Species in the Great Lakes: A History of Biotic
Crises andAnthropogenicIntroductions, 19 L GREAT LAKES RES. 1, 2-4 (1993)).
15. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4751, as amended by NISA of 1996, 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701-4751.
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in 1996 by the National Invasive Species Act (NISA).16 Under NISA, vessels
must exchange their ballast at sea before entering the Great Lakes, 17 but the
statute does not specify federal requirements for the "purity" of ballast water
released. Instead, Coast Guard regulations set a salinity standard of at least 30
parts per thousand (ppt). 18 Although there is no evidence that 30 ppt salinity acts
as an effective biocide, it presumably indicates that an ocean exchange of
approximately 85% of water by volume occurred.' 9 However, even if 85% were
considered an adequate exchange, many foreign flag vessels pipe salt water into
their ballast tanks before they leave their home port and they may enter Great
Lakes waters with a salinity factor equal or higher than 35.3 ppt, the ocean's
salinity. 20 In addition, evaporative losses during a trans-Atlantic voyage tend to
increase salinity in the tank. 21 Given these variables, the salinity test provides no
guarantee that an adequate ocean exchange occurred.
There are broad-sweeping exemptions in NISA which further undermine the
exchange requirements. First, exchange can be avoided on the grounds of ship
safety, left almost entirely to the captain's discretion. 2 Safety reasons can
23
include "vessel architectural design" or "other extraordinary circumstances."
Accordingly, a captain who sails a poorly designed ship, or, arguably, even a ship
with an inexperienced crew or one sailing under a tight schedule, can avoid
ballast exchange. Ships that fail to accomplish an exchange outside of the
exclusive economic zone must employ another method of ballast water
management before entering the Great Lakes, 24 or request the Coast Guard's
permission to exchange ballast water in an alternative designated area. 5
Further, NISA does not require the treatment of residual sediments and slop in
the tanks of ships fully loaded with cargo, also known as "no ballast on board", or
NOBOB, vessels.26 While fully loaded, the residue in a ship's ballast water tanks
is unpumpable; 27 yet, residual sediments and slop can support aquatic life forms,
which subsequently will be mixed with ballast water pumped into the tanks.

16. 16 U.S.C. §§ 4701-475 1. See O'Shea & Cangelosi, supra note 10, at 383.
17. 16 U.S.C. § 4711. Although this article is limited to United States law and policy, the
Canadian Shipping Act provides an interesting comparison. Instead of specific prohibitions and
exceptions regarding ballast water exchange, that Act, as amended in 1998, simply provides that
"[t]he Governor in Council may make regulations respecting the control and management of ballast
water." R.S.C., RS-9, § 657.1. Unlike NISA, it appears that this Act allows the adoption of control
measures beyond mere ballast exchange. See Reeves, supra note 8, at 67.
18. 33 C.F.R. § 151.1510(a)(1).
19. See Reeves, supra note 8, at 57.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See 16 U.S.C. §4711(k)(1).
23. See 16 U.S.C. §4711(k)(1).
24. See 33 C.F.R. § 151.1510.
25. See 16 U.S.C. § 471 1(k)(2)(A),(B); 33 C.F.R. § 151.1514. The exemption sweeps even
more broadly for ships traversing U.S. waters other than the Great Lakes. These ships may avoid
exchange on safety grounds and proceed to discharge water "in any harbor." Id.
26. See Reeves, supra note 8, at 54-55.
27. See id. at 54.
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As a result, NISA is largely ineffective for preventing exotic species invasions.
II.

THE CWA'S APPLICATION TO BALLAST WATER
DISCHARGES FROM VESSELS

The CWA prohibits the "discharge of any pollutant by any person," unless 28a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit is obtained.
The "discharge of a pollutant" is defined, in relevant part, as "any addition of any
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source." Navigable waters include
all surface waters of the United States, including lakes, rivers and streams,
wetlands, and 30the territorial seas, extending seaward from the coast for a distance
of three miles.
Pollutants are added to United States waters from a point source when ballast
water containing exotic species is pumped from vessels. Yet, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), by regulation, excludes ballast water discharges from
the NPDES program: "The following discharges do not require NPDES permits:
(a) Any discharge of sewage from vessels, effluent from properly functioning
marine engines, laundry, shower, and galley sink wastes, or any other discharge
incidental to the normal operation of a vessel.' 1 The Pacific Environmental
Advocacy Center and other groups petitioned EPA for the repeal of its regulation
in January 1999.32 In response, EPA acknowledged that ballast water could be
covered by CWA's prohibition on point source discharges, and stated that it
would prepare a regort to "explore options" for regulating ballast water by
September 1, 1999.
However, no official report or proposed rule has been
issued to date. Once EPA 34
makes a final determination, it could be subject to a
citizen suit under the CWA.

28. CWA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
29. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
30. CWA § 502(7)-(8), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)-(8). See United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985) (upholding the regulatory definition of navigable waters).
31. 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a).
32. Letter from Pacific Environmental Advocacy (PEAC) to Carol Browner (Jan. 13, 1999) (on
file with author).
33. Letter from Asst. Administrator Charles Fox to Craig N. Johnston, PEAC (Apr. 6, 1999)
(on file with author).
34. See CWA § 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2) ("any citizen may commence a civil action...
against the Administrator [of EPA] where there is alleged a failure.., to perform any act or duty
under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator."); Natural Resources Defense
Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (requiring EPA to regulate agricultural return
flows as point sources). See also Section III.D., infra (discussing citizen suits).
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A. Exotic species are pollutants
The language of the statute, as well as its objectives and its legislative history,
support the inclusion of exotic "pollutants" into the regulatory program.35 The
term pollutant, as used in the CWA, means heat and a variety of substances, such
as garbage, solid waste, sewage, chemical wastes, and, most importantly here,
biological materials. 36 Although the definition of pollutant in the CWA is not so
broadly phrased as to be considered all-inclusive, 37 courts have construed it to
encompass substances not specifically enumerated but subsumed under the listed,
more general terms. 38 Thus, fish and other organisms - alive, in various life
stages, or dead - are included under the term "biological materials," and are
therefore pollutants under the CWA. 39 By way of analogy, pathogens in sewage
treatment plant effluent are undoubtedly biological pollutants, which may not be
discharged in navigable waters without a permit.4 °
Courts have, however, deferred to EPA's determination that NPDES permits
are not required when fish and fish parts are moved through a waterbody via
dams, because there is no "addition" of pollutants from dams; the fish do not
come from the "outside world" but instead originate within the same ecosystem. 4'
Similarly, EPA's decision that the transfer of cold water from an impounded
reservoir through a dam to the receiving stream or river is not an "addition" of a
pollutant has been upheld.4 2 By contrast, seafood processing plants that remove
fish and then process and discharge the fish wastes into receiving waters of the

35. See David Whalen, The Control of Aquatic Nuisance Nonindigenous Species, 5 ENVTL.
LAW. 65, WL *10-12, 26-27 (1998) (reviewing legislative history of the CWA and determining
that the definition of pollutants should include living aquatic invasive species); Reeves, White
Paper,supra note 2, at 6 (agreeing that exotic species are pollutants, as a matter of law, economics
and common sense). See also David Eldridge, supra note 13, at 49.
36. CWA § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
37. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (finding in
dicta that cold, unlike heat, is a water condition; because cold is not specifically listed, while heat
is, cold is not necessarily a pollutant).
38. See United States v. Hamel, 551 F.2d 107 (6th Cir. 1977) (affirming the district court's
decision that petroleum products are included under the broad term "chemical waste," even though
Congress did not list oil and oil products by name within the definition of pollutant). See also
Hudson River Fishermen's Ass'n v. City of New York, 751 F. Supp. 1088, 1101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that chlorine, when discharged into navigable waters, is regarded as a pollutant, though
intended for a beneficial use), affd, 940 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1991).
39. See Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988). See also
United States v. Dubois, 102 F.3d 1273, 1296-97 & n.29 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that movement of
organisms in river water to a pond is an addition of pollutants; although defendant's snowmaking
did not itself contribute new pollutants, it was undisputed that the river contained at least some
pollutants not found in the pond, including the parasitic giardialambia); Ass'n of Pacific Fisheries
v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794, 807 n.7 & 815 (9th Cir. 1980) (concluding that fish wastes discharged from
seafood processors are pollutants).
40. See U.S. v. Frezell, 461 F. Supp. 266, 269-70 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (holding that bacteria in
compost runoff is a biological material and therefore a pollutant), afTd, 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980).
41. See Consumers Power,693 F.2d at 584-86.
42. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 156.
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United States are adding pollutants.43
The EPA has recognized that exotic species are pollutants in a variety of other
contexts. For example, in proposing Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL)
regulations for drinking water contaminants, EPA stated that "all microbial

contaminants that may be discharged to waters of the U.S. (e.g., bacteria, viruses

and other organisms) fall under the term 'biological materials."'44 In addition,
EPA implicitly acknowledged that invasive species contribute to water quality
impairment when it approved California's list of 472 impaired waters, including
those listed as impaired because of the presence of invasive species.45
B.

Vessels arepoint sources

Vessels which discharge ballast water into waters of the United States are
expressly included in the CWA's definition of a "point source." The term is
defined broadly as "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including

but not limited to any pipe... or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged." 46 The definitional section excludes only
"agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
47
agriculture.,
Although agency interpretations of a statute under its administration are
generally given deference, interpretations which fly in the face of explicit
mandates of the statute, such as EPA's regulatory exclusion of ballast, must be set

43. See 40 C.F.R. Part 408; Pacific Fisheries,615 F.2d at 801. Similarly, the discharge of
dredged-up sediments and debris, although indigenous materials at their place of origin, adds
pollutants when introduced to another area. See United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc., 772 F.2d
1501, 1506 (11th Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds, 481 U.S. 1034 (1985), reh'g on other
grounds, 863 F.2d 802 (1989); United States v. Banks (S.D. Fla. 1995); United States v. Zaner
(N.D. Cal. 1991).
44. Proposed Revisions to the Water Quality Planning and Management Regulation, 64 Fed.
Reg. 46012, 46017 (1999). See CWA § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (requiring the identification of
impaired waters and establishment of TMDLs); discussion at Section II.C infra (discussing TMDL
program).
45. See 63 Fed. Reg. 59556 (1998); Brent Foster, Pollutants Without Half-lives: The Role of
Federal Environmental Laws in Controlling Ballast Water Discharges of Exotic Species, 30
ENVTL. L. at 18 (2000). See also L. Blaney & T. Kemp, WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BOARD,
15-SUM CAL. REG. L. REP. 149, 150 (noting that an objective of California's Plan is to reduce the
impacts of introduced species on native species in the San Francisco Bay/Delta Estuary).
46. CWA § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added).
47. Id. In addition, a limited exemption for stormwater runoff from mining activities is found
outside of the definitional section. See CWA § 402(I)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(l)(2).
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aside. 48 "[T]echnological or administrative infeasibility of [uniform national
effluent] limitations may result in adjustments in the permit programs... but it
does not authorize the49Administrator to exclude the relevant point source from
the NPDES program.,
Not only is the regulation inconsistent with the plain language of the CWA's
"point source" definition, it undermines the CWA's straightforward and
ambitious objectives. 50 The CWA is intended to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of waters of the United States, 5, and
to ensure water quality supports fisheries and other designated uses, such as
recreation.52 There is no dispute that invasive species, no less than other
pollutants, have had tremendous effects on Great Lakes' water quality and native
biodiversity.
Moreover, neither the legislative nor the regulatory history supports the
exclusion of ballast water discharges. The legislative history of the CWA
specifies that all discharges to waters of the United States, the contiguous zone
and the ocean "were to be regulated by EPA under one Act or the other. 5 3 The
Committee on Public Works and Commerce intended "complete and integrated
regulation of the disposal of pollutants into all waters and over all sources of
pollutants subject to itsjurisdiction."04
48. See Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(invalidating EPA's exclusion for agricultural return flows as inconsistent with the plain language
of section 502(14); Congress later amended that provision to explicitly exclude return flows);
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that
courts reviewing statutory interpretations by agencies should first determine whether the statute is
ambiguous; if it is not, the court may not defer to the agency, but must give effect to the plain
meaning of the statute). See also Chevron v. Hammond, 726 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1984)
(upholding Alaska's application of the permit system to oil-tainted ballast water discharged from
vessels, noting that the CWA provided only limited exemptions to the otherwise comprehensive
NPDES program).
49. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1379.
50. See Hammond, 726 F.2d at 493 (finding that CWA's objectives support Alaska's
application of the NPDES program to ballast water).
51. CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (emphasis added).
52. CWA § 101(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2).
53. See 44 Fed. Reg. 32859 (1979) (citing SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) at 1492 (referencing the CWA and the Marine Sanctuaries Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1431, et seq.)). The Ocean Dumping Act (ODA) compliments the CWA with regard to emissions
outside of the CWA's jurisdiction, as it prohibits vessels registered in the United States or flying a
United States flag from transporting "any material for the purpose of dumping it into ocean waters."
33 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2). The ODA also prohibits any person from dumping "any material
transported from a location outside the United States" into United States territorial seas, or the U.S.
contiguous zone if it may affect U.S. territorial seas or territory, unless a permit is obtained. 33
U.S.C. § 1411 (b). The United States claims a contiguous zone of twelve miles from its baseline.
See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1402(b);19 U.S.C. §14010). See also Pres. Proclamation No. 5928 (Dec. 27,
1988); 54 Fed. Reg. 777 (1989). In addition, nations may generally exercise jurisdiction over
foreign flag vessels that violate its customs, fiscal, immigration, or sanitary laws if the vessels are
traveling within their contiguous zone. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art.
33, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (Dec. 10, 1982).
54. 44 Fed. Reg. 32859, (citing SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1973) at 1492 (emphasis added).
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The regulatory history of section 122.3 indicates that EPA may not have
intended ballast water discharges to be excluded when the regulation was first
issued in 1973. The provision as originally proposed in the federal register
excluded only "discharges from properly functioning marine engines."' 55 The
final provision was extended to "discharges incidental to the normal operation of
a vessel," but it did not cover trash discarded overboard or discharges from
vessels acting in a capacity other than transportation, "such as when a vessel is
being used as a storage facility or a cannery." 56 EPA's explanation indicates that
the exclusion for incidental discharges was meant to apply to recreational boats,
not commercial vessels: "This type of discharge generally causes little pollution
and the exclusion of vessel wastes
from the permit requirements will reduce
57
administrative costs dramatically."
Other provisions of the CWA provide support for treating ballast discharges as
point sources subject to the NPDES program. First, statutory amendments
enacted in 1996 exclude incidental discharges from military vessels from the
definition of pollutant.5 8 Although Congress expressly noted that "[v]essels are
point sources of pollution" under the CWA,59 it believed that an alternative
program was desirable for the military, given the operational problems
experienced by the Navy when various coastal states attempted to impose
inconsistent regulatory requirements or inspection programs on naval vessels.60
Thus, instead of obtaining NPDES permits to discharge their ballast water,
military vessels must comply with another new provision, section 312(n),6 '
which requires on-board marine pollution control devices if such devices are
reasonable and practicable.62 This exclusion provides at least some evidence that
Congress intended for incidental discharges, like ballast water, from non-military
vessels to
included in the NPDES program. Generally, an explicit
exclusion of one activity negates an implied exclusion of another type of

55. 38 Fed. Reg. 1363-1364 (1973). See Daniel E. O'Toole, Regulation of Navy Ship
Discharges Under the Clean Water Act: Have Too Many Chefs Spoiled the Broth?, 19 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 12-13 (1994) (discussing history of EPA's ballast water
exemption).
56. 40 C.F.R. § 125.4(c), See 38 Fed. Reg. 13528, 13530 (1973). See also 44 Fed. Reg. 32859
(1979) (stating that, although the CWA does not define "vessels or other floating craft, it appears
that those terms refer to transportation vessels").
57. 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528 (1973). Similarly, the legislative history of the CWA indicates that
Congress believed that permitting for millions of recreational boats would have been an
"unreasonable expenditure of administrative effort" as well as an "unreasonable burden on the
individual boat owners." See O'Toole, supra note 55, at 12-13 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 16,875-76

(1972)).
58. See Uniform National Discharge Standards for Armed Forces Vessels Act, CWA § 502(6),
33 U.S.C. § 1362(6).
59. S,REP. NO. 113, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (S. REP. NO. 104-113), at 1.
60. S.REP. No. 104-113, at 1, 7.
61. CWA § 312(n), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(n); See 40 C.F.R. Part 1700.
62. See CWA § 312 (n)(1),(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(n)(1), (2). See also discussion, infra, at IV.B.
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63

activity.
The subsequent enactment of a statutory exclusion for military vessels could,
however, cut the other way. Arguably, the fact that Congress had notice that
EPA was, by regulation, excluding ballast discharges from NPDES coverage, and
amended the relevant provisions of the CWA with respect 64to military discharges
only, indicates congressional approval of EPA's regulation.
Yet, post-enactment developments like the exclusion for military vessels
cannot properly be described as legislative history, and therefore, cannot be given
the weight of contemporaneous legislative reports or statements. 65 "[T]he views
of a subsequent
Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an
66
earlier one.",
A reviewing court would likely find that the definitional provisions of CWA
section 502, along with the general prohibition of section 301,67 are clear and
unambiguous, and give post-enactment legislative history little, if any, weight.68
If the statute is plain on its face, courts need not resort to legislative history for

63. See Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 618 (1980); League to Save Lake Tahoe,
Inc. v. Trounday, 598 F.2d 1164, 1171 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S. 943 (1979). See also City of
Chicago v. Envtl. Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 338 (1994) (in refusing to imply exemption from
hazardous waste regulation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), Court noted
that Congress had provided a complete exemption in a separate section of RCRA by utilizing a
comprehensive list of relevant activities, and therefore "knew how to draft a waste stream
exemption in RCRA when it wanted to."). See also Hammond, 726 F.2d at 488 (noting that CWA's
explicit exclusion for certain types of discharges supported inclusion of ballast water in the NPDES
program).
64. "[T]he congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive
evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Congress." Geldermann, Inc. v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm'n, 836 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267, 274-75 (1974)).
65. See Redlark v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 141 F.3d 936, 941 (9th Cir. 1998).
66. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-19 (1980)
(footnote omitted) (citing United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348-49 (1963)
and United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)); See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456
U.S. 512 (1982) (post hoc congressional actions may be viewed as instructive as to the
reasonableness of an agency's interpretation.); See Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 48789 (1940) (once an agency's statutory construction has been "fully brought to the attention of the
public and the Congress," and Congress has not sought to alter it although it has amended the
statute in other respects, a court may presume that the agency has correctly discerned the
legislature's intent.).
67. CWA §§ 301(a), 502(6), (14), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(6), (14).
68. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991) ("Where a statute
contains a phrase that is unambiguous-that has a clearly accepted meaning in both legislative and
judicial practice-we do not permit it to be expanded or contracted by the statements of individual
legislators or committees during the course of the enactment process."); United States v. Ron Pair
Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989) ("[W]here, as here, the statute's language is plain, 'the
sole function of the court is to enforce it according to its terms."') (quoting Caminetti v. United
States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (if the statute is unambiguous on its
face, the court must simply effectuate its terms instead of deferring to an agency's interpretation).
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confirmation, but must give the language of the statute "its natural meaning. '' 69
While EPA does have some'power to define technical terms like "point source"
and "pollutant",70 broad-sweeping categorical exemptions like the one for ballast
discharges from commercial vessels would likely be rejected as inconsistent with
the plain language of the CWA.71
A second provision of the CWA provides additional support for including
ballast water discharges in the NPDES program. The CWA's definition of a
"discharge of a pollutant" expressly includes discharges to the contiguous zone or
the ocean "from any point source other than a vessel or floating craft. ' 72 The
contiguous zone is the area from three to twelve miles out to sea. 73 "Navigable
waters" include the territorial seas, which extend seaward three miles, but not the
contiguous zone.74 Accordingly, vessels that discharge any pollutant to the
territorial seas are in fact discharging pollutants from point sources.
Other statutes and executive materials support this interpretation of the CWA.
NISA, enacted after the CWA, provides for the application of the CWA to ballast
discharges by stating that it does "not affect or supercede any requirements or
prohibitions pertaining to the discharge of ballast" under the CWA.75 The plain
language of this broadly worded savings clause confirms that the CWA may be
applied to ballast water discharges in United States waters.7 6
Finally, as a matter of federal policy, Executive Order 13112 directs EPA and
other agencies to "use existing programs and authorities to prevent introduction
of invasive species. 7 7 EPA not only has the authority and even the mandate to
regulate ballast under CWA section 402, but executive policy states it should do
so as a matter of federal prerogative.
The EPA has experience and technical expertise in controlling pollution 69. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 386 n.2 (1992). See Chevron, 467
U.S. at 842-83; Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 591-592 (1980). The statute itself,
not committee reports or other legislative statements, provides the "authoritative expression" of the
law. See Envtl. Defense Fund, 511 U.S. at 337 (holding that ash generated by resource recovery
facility's incineration of municipal solid waste was subject to RCRA regulatory scheme governing
hazardous waste pursuant to plain language of Section 3001(i), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(i)).
70. See Gorsuch, 693 F.2d at 167.

71. See Costle, 568 F.2d at 1375.
72. CWA § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
73. See CWA § 502(9), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(9); Convention of the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 33, 15 U.S.T. 1607, 1612-13, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 220-22
(1958); 63 Fed. Reg. 45298,45300 (1998).
74. See CWA § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
75. 16U.S.C. § 4711(b)(2)(C), (c)(2)(J).
76. The legislative history of NISA indicates that Congress wanted to ensure that the CWA
continues to govern the discharge of oily or chemical-laden ballast. See Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee, S. REP. 101-523 on S.2244, at 6 (Oct. 11, 1990), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6455, 6450 (S.2244 was incorporated into H.R. 5390, which was then passed into law as the final
act, P.L. 101-646 (Nov. 29, 1990)). However, there is no evidence that Congress intended to limit
this provision to ballast contaminated with oil or chemicals. To read such a limitation into the
statute would fail to do justice to the plain language of NISA's broadly phrased savings clause, in
violation of the principle that the language of the statute itself, not the legislative statements,
provides the "authoritative expression" of the law. See Envtl. Defense Fund, 511 U.S. at 337.
77. Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (1999).
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chemical, physical and biological - under the CWA and other federal statutes.
By comparison, the Coast Guard, an agency within the Department of
Transportation,7 8 has a wholly different statutory mission - safety on United
States waters. 79 Its primary responsibilities are enforcement of federal laws on
the high seas and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States; safety of
life and property at sea; aiding navigation through activities such as ice-breaking;
and readiness to function with the Navy in time of war. 80 A cooperative
arrangement between EPA and the Coast Guard would be mutually beneficial in
the context of ballast water discharges.
The CWA envisions working relationships between EPA and other agencies in
other contexts, including the dredge and fill provisions of CWA section 404.81
There, the Army Corps of Engineers issues permits for activities that affect
wetlands, while the EPA holds veto power over those permits. 82 The Corps,
together with EPA, jointly issues wetlands regulations.
Although the
relationship is not always an easy one, 84 the different perspectives
of the two
85
agencies can contribute to the strength of the overall program.
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NPDES PROGRAM
AS A REGULATORY TOOL
The White Paper asserts that "serious questions" exist whether the CWA has
"made any substantial contribution to the promotion of water... quality." 86 Citing
only one somewhat dated economics text, the White Paper asserts that
"[a]ccording to a considerable body
of scholarship," the regulatory approach "has
87
generally been a costly failure.,
Yet, few would deny that the quality of surface waters in the United States has

78. 14 U.S.C. § 1.
79. 14 U.S.C. § 2. The Department of Transportation is generally known as a developmentoriented department. See Oliver A. Houck, Of Bats, Birds and B-A-T: The Convergent Evolution of
EnvironmentalLaw, 63 MISS. L.J. 403, 454 (1994).
80. 14 U.S.C. § 2.

81. CWA § 404,33 U.S.C. § 1344.
82. See 40 C.F.R. § 231.1(a); James City County, Va. v. EPA, 12 F.3d 1330 (4th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 823 (1994).
83. See Natural Resources Defense Council v. Calloway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
84. See, e.g., Bersani v. Robichaud, 850 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1089
(1989) (upholding EPA veto of CWA section 404 wetland permit issued by Corps). See generally
Comment, Bersani v. EPA: Toward a PlausibleInterpretationof the 404(B)(1).
85. See Benjamin H. Grumbles & Kenneth J. Kopocis, The Water Resources Development Act
of 1992: Expanding the "Corps of EnvironmentalEngineers," 23 ELR 10379, WL *32-33 (1993)
(noting that, in carrying out the CWA's goals, both Congress and the EPA may justifiably rely more
on the Corps' expertise "in water management, wetlands protection, and other issues addressing
both water quality and quantity").
86. Reeves, White Paper,supra note 2, at 113. See also Reeves, Exotic Politics, supra note 2,
at 189-90.
87. Reeves, White Paper, supra note 2, at 109 (citing STEVEN E. RHOADES, THE
ECONOMISTS' VIEW OF THE WORLD: GOVERNMENT, MARKETS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 40, et
seq. (Cambridge Univ. Press) (1985)).
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improved immensely in the past quarter-century. "Most authorities agree that the
country has made significant progress in cleaning up pollution from 'point
88
sources,' such as most industrial discharges and sewage treatment plants."
89
credit."
the
of
share
Sections 301 and 402 of the CWA "deserve[] a lion's
As mentioned above, section 301 prohibits discharges of pollutants unless a
NPDES permit is obtained pursuant to section 402. NPDES permits must
include technology-based effluent limitations, 9° water quality related effluent
limitations, water quality standards, and ocean discharge criteria. 91 Effluent
limitations vary according to type of pollutant emitted and whether the discharger
is a new or existing source.
A.

New vessels

New sources are subject to the strictest standard of the CWA, the "best
available demonstrated control technology" (BADT),92 regardless of the type of
pollutants emitted. ,1The term "source" sweeps
relatively broadly to include any
,,93
"building, structure, facility, or installation" which may discharge pollutants. In
contrast to the Clean Air Act's provision governing new sources, section 306 is
not explicitly limited to stationary sources, and could include mobile sources

such as ships. Under the CWA, a source is considered "new" if construction
began after proposed regulations are published, establishing performance
standards for the relevant category of sources.95
BADT performance standards require the greatest degree of effluent reduction
achievable for an industrial class. 6 The BADT standard can force process
changes, operating methods or other alternatives, "including, where practicable, a
standard permitting no discharge of pollutants. 9 7 Because new sources have the
88. Debra L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of Clean Water Act Section 401, 23 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 201, 202-03 (1996). See Brian Weeks, Trends in Regulation of Stormwater and Nonpoint
Source Pollution,25 ELR 10300, 10301 (June 1995) (noting that the CWA has "drastically reduced
surface water pollution from point sources."); Houck, supra note 79, at 418, 463 (discussing drop in
point source discharges due to the CWA).
89. William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Seven Statutory Wonders of U.S. EnvironmentalLaw: Origins

and Morphology, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1994).
90. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (defining effluent limitations as "any restriction imposed by the
Director on quantities, discharge rates, and concentrations of 'pollutants' which are 'discharged'
from 'point sources' into 'waters of the United States,' the waters of the 'contiguous zone,' or the
ocean.").
91. See CWA § 402(a)-(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-(c). The Administrator can also set "other
requirements as he deems appropriate." CWA § 402(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2).
92. CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).
93. CWA § 306(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(3). Facilities, in turn, are defined by regulation as
"buildings, structures, process or production equipment or machinery which form a permanent part
of the new source and which will be used in its operation.... ." See 40 C.F.R. § 122.29(5). This
term, like the term "building," seems to include only stationary sources. The terms "structure" and
"installation," however, could be construed more broadly.
94. 42U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2), (b)(1)(A).
95. CWA § 306(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(2).
96. See CWA § 306(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1).

97. Id.
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opportunity to install the best and most efficient production processes and
treatment technologies, generally at lower cost than retrofitting existing facilities,
BADT "should represent the most stringent numerical values attainable through
the application of the best available control technology" for all types of
pollutants. 98
Although stringent, BADT is unlikely to put most new facilities in economic
jeopardy because they are only required to adopt technologies already
demonstrated, and because Section 306 directs EPA to consider both the cost of
achieving the effluent reduction and any non-water quality environmental
impacts and energy requirements.99 In addition, BADT provides protection for
facilities that meet all applicable standards; they will not be subjected to any
more stringent standards of performance during the ten-year period following
completion of construction, or depreciation or amortization of the facility,
whichever date is earlier.'0 0
Thus far, BADT has only been applied to a limited number of industrial
categories, many of which are explicitly listed in Section 306.101 EPA is directed
to revise the list of categories governed by BADT "from time to time."' 012 Once
vessels are listed under Section 306, BADT would most certainly be more
stringent than NISA's requirement for 30 ppt salinity, or roughly 85% ballast
exchange, and would result in greater reductions in contaminated ballast
discharges in vulnerable U.S. waters as new ships are built.
B.

Existing vessels

Effluent limitations for existing facilities and vessels vary according to the
type of pollutant discharged. Existing sources of toxic and nonconventional
pollutants are required to meet effluent limitations based on the best available
technology (BAT). 0 3 In comparison, existing sources of conventional pollutants,
such as suspended solids and fecal coliform, must meet the best conventional

98. Final Rule for Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Category Effluent Limitations Guidelines,
Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards, 63 Fed. Reg. 50388, 50390
(1998).
99. CWA § 306(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B). See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0.
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical:The Rationalefor Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 DUKE L.J.
729, 744 n.80 (1991) (reaching similar conclusion with respect to BAT standard).
100. CWA § 306(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(d).
101. See CWA § 306(b)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(A) (including pulp and paper mills, meat
product and rendering processing, grain mills, and other types of industrial facilities).

102. Id.
103. See CWA § 301(b)(1), (g)(1), 33 U.S.C.§ 131 l(b)(1), (g)(1).
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technology (BCT) for their industrial category.'

4

0

Toxic pollutants include those listed pursuant to section 307.1°5
Nonconventional pollutants fall into a "catch-all" category of pollutants - those
that are not toxic or conventional. 10 6 Congress explicitly listed several
nonconventional pollutants, such as chlorine, ammonia, color, as well as the
thermal component of discharges 10 7 and gave EPA authority to list additional

nonconventionals.10 8

Although some components of ballast water discharges, such as suspended
solids, would be considered conventional pollutants, biological materials like
exotic species would likely fall under the catch-all category of nonconventional
pollutants, and therefore subject to BAT. If EPA were to characterize exotics as
nonconventionals, that determination would be reasonable and would be
accorded great deference. 0 9
BAT generally requires that existing technology utilized by the "cleanest"

firms in the industry be adopted. 110 In setting BAT, EPA takes into account

engineering technology and operational processes for categories and
subcategories of industry."' Although BAT is established with reference to the
"best" technology, it does not require the facility to adopt any one particular
technology. Instead, individual dischargers may choose their own abatement
technique as long as the effluent levels specified in their permits are met.112
In addition, EPA is to consider the costs of achieving the best technology
available and any non-water quality impacts, as well as energy requirements, in
setting BAT." 3 The EPA retains considerable discretion in assigning the weight

104. See CWA § 304(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4). Congress designated the following
conventional pollutants in the CWA: biochemical oxygen demanding (BOD) pollutants, like
nitrogen and phosphorous; total suspended solids (TSS); fecal coliform; pH; and any additional
pollutants defined by the Administrator as conventional. CWA § 304(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. §
1314(a)(4). EPA subsequently designated oil and grease as an additional conventional pollutant on
July 30, 1979 (44 Fed. Reg. 44501). Conventionals are generally oxygen demanding and
eutrophying, or contribute to turbidity. See EPA Policy for the Development of Water QualityBased Permit Limitations for Toxic Pollutants, 49 Fed. Reg. 9016 (1984).
105. See CWA § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317.
106. See CWA § 301(b)(2)(F), (g)(1), (4), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F), (g)(1), (4).
107. See CWA § 301(g)(1), (4), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(1), (4).
108. See CWA § 301(b)(2)(F), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F).
109. See Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1292 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that "EPA's decision
to treat settleable solids as a nonconventional pollutant and thus subject to BAT standards was both
reasonable and permissible") (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837). See also American Petroleum Inst.
v. EPA., 858 F.2d 262, 263 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding EPA's designation of diesel oil as
nonconventional "indicator" pollutant, resulting in imposition of more stringent BAT regulations
over discharge of muds and cuttings contaminated with diesel oil for use in off-shore drilling
operations), clarifiedon other grounds,864 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1989).
110. See Houck, supra note 79, at 451.
111. See CWA §§ 301(b)(2)(A), 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(A), 1314 (b)(2)(B);
Houck, supra note 79, at 445 n.188.
112. See Dale B. Thompson, Beyond Benefit-Cost Analysis: Institutional Transaction Costs and
Regulation of Water Quality, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 517, 522 (1999).
113. CWA § 304(b)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B).
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to be accorded these factors."14 Although costs play a role in setting BAT, unlike
the BCT limitation for conventional pollutants, '5 EPA need not perform a costbenefit analysis or otherwise justify its choice of BAT on economic grounds, as
long as it has determined that the costs can be borne by industry.'
That the
technology is indeed available provides evidence costs that can be borne by the
industry.
[O]stensibly cost-blind standards can help stimulate the development of
improved pollution control technology. Thus, they can be rationalized as
important elements of efforts to ascertain where technology-forcing can be
pursued with greatest promise. Regulations that confront industry with the
prospect of substantial compliance costs create greater incentives for the
development of cheaper control technology. Time and time again, after
regulations have gone into effect, regulatory targets have proven able to do
what they previously claimed was impossible when they were seeking to
forestall the regulations. A study of industrial responses to regulation
found that the stringency of regulation
' 1 7 was "the most important factor
innovation."
technological
influencing
Most facilities have been able to comply with BAT at a reasonable cost. 1 18
BAT does not require a blind eye toward differences among facilities within
industrial categories and among geographical areas. EPA has the authority to
grant variances or modifications to account for operational differences and even
economic hardship." 9 Section 301(g) authorizes a waiver from BAT
requirements for nonconventional pollutants if the applicant can demonstrate that
its proposed modified effluent limitation is equal to or more stringent than the
applicable water quality standards and the initial standard required under the
CWA, i.e., the "best practicable control technology currently available" (BPT). 2
The applicant must also show that the modification will not result in additional
requirements for other sources, and demonstrate its discharges will not impair the
integrity of the receiving water or pose unacceptable risks to the environment or
114. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 879 F.2d 177 (5th Cir. 1989).
115. BCT is roughly equivalent to the "best of the average" performers in an industrial category.
BCT limitations are established in light of a variety of factors, including a two part "costreasonableness" test. See CWA § 304(b)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B); American Paper
Institute v. EPA, 660 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1981). EPA's current methodology for the development of
BCT limitations was issued in 1986. 51 Fed. Reg. 24974 (July 9, 1986).
116. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 879 F.2d at 250, citing EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449
U.S. 64, 71 n. 10 (1980) (Section 304(b)(2)(B) "does not state that costs shall be considered in
relation to effluent reduction").
117. Robert V. Percival, RegulatoryEvolution and the Future of EnvironmentalPolicy, 1997 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 159 (1997), (citing KURT FISCHER & JOHAN SCHOT, ENVIRONMENTAL
STRATEGIES FOR INDUSTRY 282 (Island 1993) (citing Nicholas A. Ashford, Understanding
Technological Responses of Industrial Firms to Environmental Problems: Implications for
Government Policy)).
118. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 99, at 744 n.80.
119. See, e.g., CWA § 301(c),(g),(h), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(c),(g),(h).
120. CWA § 301(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g).

Spring 2000]

ENJOY THE DONUT

persistency, acute or chronic toxicity, or
human health due to bioaccumulation,
2
synergistic propensities.' '
In addition, section 301(c) gives the EPA authority to modify BAT
requirements upon a showing that such modified requirements will: (1) represent

the maximum use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or
operator, and (2) result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of
the discharge of pollutants. 22 Section 30 1(n) also allows variances if the facility
23
demonstrates it is fundamentally different with respect to relevant factors.
The imposition of BAT would likely force older vessels to retrofit to achieve
greater exchange rates or employ alternative treatment technologies to avoid

introducing exotics through ballast discharges altogether.

24

There is reason to

believe that existing vessels can do better than the current exchange rate, and this
would be necessary if BAT applied. 12 In fact, the Coast Guard has indicated that
90% is an achievable rate of exchange for existing vessels. 126 Although there are
few incentives under the current regime for ships to improve upon their exchange
rate or employ the "best" available alternative strategies, several promising
technologies are currently being explored: shoreside treatment; ultraviolet light;

micro-filtration; ozonation; environmentally friendly biocides; and temperature

A Canadian vessel, the ALGONORTH, is implementing a
(heat). 127
demonstration project, utilizing a filter that can trap particles as small as twentyfive microns. 128 This would trap aquatic vertebrates, fish eggs and mussel veliger
larvae, along with most invertebrate eggs, fungi and algae cysts. 129 With

light or biocides, even smaller bacteria
additional treatment, such as ultraviolet
30

and viruses could be eradicated.1
While BADT for new vessels could arguably establish standards reflecting the
121. See id.
122. See CWA § 301(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
123. CWA § 301(n), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(n). The CWA also allowed dischargers of conventional
pollutants to use "innovative technology" resulting in effluent reductions significantly greater than
otherwise applicable standards, so long as the control method "moves toward the national goal of
eliminating the discharge of all pollutants." CWA 301(k), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(k).
124. See Foster, supra note 45, at *WL 25 n.125 (discussing expert opinions regarding ship
board versus on shore treatment).
125. See Reeves, supra note 8, at 66 (indicating that 98% exchange may be a "reasonably high
standard"); 63 Fed. Reg. 17782, 17785-89 (1998) (proposed Coast Guard regulations would require
90%, a "reasonably complete exchange").
126. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 17785, 17789.
127. See Reeves, White Paper,supra note 2, at 47-50 (assessing relative merits and costs of
improved ballast exchange, filtering, UV light, biocides, heat, and shoreside treatment); Foster,
supra note 45, at *WL 25 n.125 (discussing application and success of various alternatives in
experimental efforts).
128. See Lake Carrier's Association, ManagingBallast Water to Stop the Introduction of NonIndigenous Species (visited Sept. 17, 1999) <http://www.lcaships.com/hpbw.html>.
129. See Reeves, White Paper,supra note 2, at 117.
130. See id. The ALGONORTH, however, filters only 1,500 gallons per minute; 1,000-foot
United States lakers, carrying as much as 14 million gallons of ballast water when "light" on cargo,
could require filtration up to 18,000 gallons per minute. See Lake Carrier's Association, supra
note 128; Allegra Cangelosi, The Algonorth Experiment, SEAWAY REV. at 29-33 (Jan. - Mar.,
1997).
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ALGONORTH project, the BAT standard would not be set this high until the
filtration system is better established and more widely available. However, if
EPA were to simply set BAT at NISA levels, it could be challenged for failing to
consider better control technologies. Although EPA need not be "fully cognizant
of every innovation, wherever employed...," it is arbitrary and capricious to
consider only those technologies that are widely available.13 For example, EPA
has been required to consider zero discharges for the organic chemicals, plastics
and synthetics fibers industries where
thirty-six plants had already eliminated
32
their discharges through recycling.'
The CWA's effluent limitations would also apply to NOBOB's. The vessel
itself is the regulated point source, regardless of the quantity of ballast water;
therefore, BAT would be set for NOBOB's just as it would for other vessels. In
other words, treatment or exchange would be required prior to discharge into
U.S. waters, regardless of whether a vessel entered fully loaded or not. Possible
options include requiring NOBOB vessels to lighten their load of cargo by an
amount that would allow an influx of enough water to pump out the residues (an
operation called "swish and spit"). 133 Other suggested treatment methods for
134
sediment and slop in a NOBOB tank include chemical biocides and heat.
C.

Water Quality Standards

In addition to effluent limitations, permit requirements must be ratcheted up if
necessary to meet water quality standards. 35 The States generally adopt water
136
quality standards based on EPA guidelines and subject to EPA approval.
Section 303(c) requires that state water quality standards "protect the public
health or welfare, enhance the quality of water and serve the purposes of this
[Act] ...taking into consideration their use and value for propagation of fish and
wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricultural, industrial, and other
purposes."' 137 The enhancement of water quality for the protection of the
propagation of fish and other aquatic life is a key concern of section 303.138
Under section 303(c), a water quality standard for a specific waterbody
consists of two components: designated uses for which a waterbody is to be
131. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 870 F.2d at 263.
132. See id. at 264. See Houck, supra note 79, at 452 (noting that EPA's final standard for
organic chemicals and plastics could hardly be called the best available technology, where EPA
failed to recognize that recycling technologies adopted by a number of plants had already achieved
zero discharge).
133. Reeves, supra note 8, at 55 (noting that "swish and spit" would require approximately
1.5% reduction in cargo).
134. See id. at 55.
135. CWA § 303(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(b)(1)(C). "[T]here shall be achieved ... any more
stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards.., established
pursuant to any State law or regulations." Id.
136. See CWA §§ 304(a), 303(c), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(a), 1313(c).
137. CWA § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c).
138. See id. The ultimate purpose of water quality standards, as with the other provisions of the
CWA, is "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's
waters." CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a).
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protected (such as recreation in and on the water, protection and propagation of
fish and wildlife, or agricultural uses) and the water quality criteria which
support those designated uses. 139 Each state must identify those waters for which
existing technology-based pollution controls are not stringent enough to attain or
maintain state water quality standards. Section 303(d)(2) requires that states
submit and EPA approve or disapprove lists of waters for which existing
technology-based pollution controls are not stringent enough to attain or maintain
state water quality standards.140 For those waters identified, states are required to
establish total maximum daily loads (TMDLs) for identified pollutants as
necessary to implement applicable water quality standards with an adequate
margin of safety.
California, for example, has listed several water bodies as impaired due to the
presence of exotic species. 42 Theoretically, any permitted discharge into an
impaired water would have to attain zero discharge of exotics to protect
designated uses and avoid further degradation of those waters. 143 Disparate
standards among the states could result in a patchwork-quilt of regulatory
requirements, varying among jurisdictions. To ensure compliance, vessels could
be required to meet the most stringent restrictions of all states they pass through.
Ship owners and operators would resist individual state efforts as confusing
44 and
inefficient. Some uniformity may be necessary to-address these concems.
D. Public involvement and enforcement
The CWA permit program is all the more effective because it provides both
opportunities for public involvement and straightforward enforcement provisions.
Before a permit may issue, EPA must allow for public comment and determine
45
that the discharge will comply with the applicable requirements of the CWA.1
Input received during the public comment period is included as part of the
administrative record.14 6 At the close of the comment period, the Regional
Administrator decides whether to issue or deny a permit application. 47 Any
a formal hearing within thirty days of the
interested person may request
4
Administrator's determination. 1
Once a permit is in place, the CWA provides for enforcement through citizen
suits as well as administrative, civil and criminal penalties. Thus, bringing
ballast water discharges into the CWA program would result in almost immediate
improvement: the CWA's significant civil and criminal penalties, along with

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

See 40 C.F.R. part 131.
See CWA § 303(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
See CWA § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C).
See 63 Fed. Reg. 59556.
See Foster, supra note 45, at 23-24.
See Section IV.B infra.
See CWA § 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1); 40 C.F.R. § 124.12(c).
See 40 C.F.R §§ 124.10, 124.12(a)(4).
40 C.F.R. § 124.15.
40 C.F.R. § 124.74(a).
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provisions for citizen suits with attorneys' fee awards, provide powerful
incentives for dischargers to improve operations as quickly as possible. 149
This straightforward and effective enforcement scheme, in which the permit
holder must report on and be held accountable for its compliance with its
permit and which provides multiple opportunities for enforcement, including
by citizens, did not come about by accident. Congress consciously
mandated an aggressive, effective enforcement system when it drafted the
Clean Water Act, providing, for example, for citizen suits. During Senate
consideration of the conference report in 1972, Sen. Birch Bayh (D-Ind.)
said: 'We have learned by disappointing experience, Mr. President, that
without strict enforcement and meaningful deterrents, water pollution
control laws will have no real effect.
The bill before us provides the
' 150
enforcement and deterrents we need.
The opportunity for both industry and environmental interest groups to
challenge EPA decisions in court provides a tremendous incentive for the agency
to equitably and reasonably balance competing interests and embrace effective,
yet practical, solutions. "Judicial review is one reason American environmental
law works, and the quite similar laws of other countries do not."'15'
CWA section 505 authorizes any citizen to commence a civil action "against
any person.., who is alleged to be in violation of... an effluent standard or
limitation under this chapter."' 152 In enacting CWA section 505, Congress
recognized, at least implicitly, citizens would be especially effective advocates. 153
"One of the greatest elements of the U.S. system of environmental law, itself
arguably the greatest in the world, is the citizen lawsuit."' 154 The list of citizen
suits which have impacted the way business is done in the United States is
impressive, ranging from ConEdison's thwarted plan to build a huge
hydroelectric facility on Storm King Mountain, to the Tennessee Valley
Authority's confrontation with the snail darter, to Disney's attempts to build a ski

149. See Rodgers, supra note 89, at 1012 (noting that one of the reasons for the CWA's
successes in reducing water pollution is its effective system of monitoring, underscored by a highly
effective citizen-suit mechanism).
150. Drew Caputo, A Job HalfFinished: The Clean Water Act After 25 Years, 27 ELR 10574,
n.82 (1997) (citing U.S. Government Printing Office, I A Legislative History of the Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 216 (1973)).
151. Houck, supra note 79, at 467.
152. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). An "effluent standard or limitation" is defined
as, among other things, an unlawful act under CWA § 301(a). Id. at § 1365(0.
153. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 63 (1986) (noting that
Congress, through various provisions of the CWA, encouraged "citizen initiatives to enforce the
water pollution laws"). See also Jeffrey G. Miller, Private Enforcement of Federal Pollution
Control Laws Part 1, 13 ELR 10309 (1983) (detailing legislative history of citizens' suits
provisions).
154. Claudia Polsky & Tom Turner, Justice on the Rampage, 21 AMICUS J. 34 (1999).
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resort in an isolated valley of the Sequoia National Forest.15 5 "'In no other
movement has litigation played such an important and
political and social
56
dominant role."'"
Citizen suits provide an opportunity to achieve enforcement where the EPA
has been unwilling or unable to achieve it due to lack of resources or, sometimes,
lack of political fortitude.1 57 They are especially important to ensure the
implementation and enforcement of politically charged programs like water
quality standards and allocations for non-point sources, many of which would
require changes in local land use planning. For example, the TMDL requirement

was virtually ignored until a
for addressing water quality-impaired water-bodies
58

series of citizen suits forced compliance.1
Without citizen enforcement, most environmental programs "would probably9
have continued to languish under the political constraints of the marketplace."'15

If not checked by aggressive enforcement, particularly by citizens, industry is
likely to bow to the economic pressure to pollute: "noncompliance results in
economic benefits (the free use of public waterways for waste disposal), while
(the construction and operation of expensive
compliance exacts a financial' 16cost
0
pollution removal facilities)."
In comparison, federal economic initiatives, whether in the form of subsidies
or taxation, generally inhibit citizen involvement. Citizens, as taxpayers, often
have difficulty establishing standing to challenge federal spending programs in
court.161 In Frothinghamv. Mellon, a taxpayer alleged that Congress, in enacting
the Maternity Act of 1921, had deprived her of property without due process in
violation of the Fifth Amendment and had invaded the legislative powers
reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment, thereby exceeding the spending
155. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (enjoining construction of dam);
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Fed. Power Comi'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965)
(remanding FPC license to construct pumped storage hydroelectric project), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
941 (1966). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) (holding that Sierra Club did not
have standing because it failed to allege that corporation or its members would be affected by the
proposed ski resort; however, the resort was never actually built). See Rodgers, supra note 89, at
209 n.12.
156. Polsky & Turner, supra note 154.
157. See Michael D. Axline & Patrick C. McGinley, Universal Statutes and Planetary
Programs:How EPA Has Dilutedthe Clean WaterAct, 8 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 253, 287-88
(1993). See Michael R. Lozeau, TailoringCitizen Enforcement to an Expanding Clean Water Act:
The San FranciscoBaykeeper Model, 28 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 429, 440 (1998) (describing
role of NRDC in CWA enforcement during diminished role of EPA during Reagan administration).
158. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLS, Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water QualityBased Regulation Underthe Clean Water Act, 27 ELR 10391 (1997).
159. Zygmunt Plater, EnvironmentalLaw and Three Economies: Navigating a Sprawling Field
of Study, Practiceand Societal Governance in Which Everything is Connected to Everything Else,
23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359, 382-83 n.54 (1999). See JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F.
KENNEDY, JR., THE RIVERKEEPERS at 178-99 (1997) (discussing need for citizen enforcement in
light of under-enforcement by federal and state environmental agencies due to "agency capture" by
regulated industry, political pressure and budget shortfalls).
160. CRONIN & KENNEDY, supra note 159, at 178.
161. See U.S. Const. art. III (providing federal courts with jurisdiction to hear only concrete
cases or controversies).
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power of Article I, Section 8.162 The Supreme Court held that the taxpayer had
no standing to bring these general grievances about the conduct of government or
the balance of power in the federal system.' 63 Thus, unless a taxpayer alleges a
violation of a specific constitutional limitation on the spending power, such as
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment,' 64 the suit will be dismissed.
The most plausible challenge to economic programs applicable to ballast water
discharges would be on the grounds of arbitrary and65 capricious action under the
APA; as such, plaintiffs would likely lack standing.'
E. The Efficacy of the CWA's Technology-Based Controls
1. The Virtues of Regulatory Programsover Economic Initiatives
Although there is still work to be done,' 66 the first round of technology-based
controls under the Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of 1972 resulted
in significant process changes. For the first time in years of federal involvement
in water quality, pollution loadings dropped and measurable abatement
occurred. 167 "Technology-based regulation is concededly imperfect...
[b]ut this
'academic failure' has been an enormous success in the real world." 168
Professor Oliver Houck describes this phenomenon as the "convergent
evolution" of successful environmental law: "Over time, the job will select the
tool.', 169 In the context of discharges into water, the successful tool has been the
NPDES program. Technology-based standards, requiring the best available
controls on the source of the pollutant, won
"their primacy because other
70
approaches simply couldn't hold their terrain." 1

162. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479 (1923).
163. Seeid.
164. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103 (1968) (noting that "one of the specific evils feared
by those who drafted the Establishment Clause ...was that the taxing and spending power would
be used to favor one religion over another or to support religion in general").
165. Challenges to economic incentive programs are almost routinely rejected for lack of
standing. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984).
166. See ADLER, LANDMAN & CAMERON, THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER
150-70 (1993).
For example, the five-year review required by CWA, which views BAT
development as a continuing, dynamic process, has bogged down under the weight of industry
resistance and judicial challenges from both sides. See Houck, supra note 79, at 456, n.240-4 1.
167. See Houck, supra note 79, at 418, 463. See also Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 99, at
746 n.96 (reporting that the CWA's initial performance standards caused "some impressive
reductions in conventional pollutant discharges," citing data on reductions from pulp and paper
mills from 1973-1984, in Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Trends 31 (1989)).
168. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 99, at 743. As Professor Houck aptly notes, "The success
of technology-based standards in abating toxic water pollution depends largely on one's
predisposition to enjoy the donut or regret the hole." Houck, supra note 1, at 310.
169. Houck, supra note 79, at 407.
170. Id. at 427. See Plater, supra note 159, at 366, 374-78, 379-82 (generally discussing historic
failure of market economics to address environmental problems).
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The predominant technology-based force in the CWA, BAT, provides the
necessary pressure of outside-in regulation. In spite of its limitations, BAT
"has probably been the most effective pollution control program in the world
in terms of producing identifiable abatement-short of outright bans-if
only because alternative programs have proven equally burdensome and so
much less effective. At the very least, the BAT process has proven, against
vigorous opposition and the most dire predictions, that pollution could in
fact be reduced without significant
losses in employment, competitiveness,
171
control, or industrial growth."
Even the Coast Guard has recognized that performance standards will work
better than NISA's salinity test. As noted above, the Coast Guard employs a 30
ppt salinity standard, which theoretically results in nominal exchange of 8385%.172 Under new regulations proposed in 1998, a requirement for 90%
exchange would have replaced the salinity test; salinity, among other things,
would merely provide evidence exchange occurred. 73 However, these changes
were not adopted when the interim rule
174 issued in May 1999 "[b]ecause of strong
opposition by the shipping industry."
Although regulatory approaches may not necessarily result in a perfect costbenefit balance,175 to the extent that excess costs occur under existing regulatory
programs, they are justifiable for a variety of reasons. First and foremost,
economic efficiency is not and should not be the only objective of environmental
programs. Instead, the strongest arguments for regulation may well sound in
democracy, sustainability, quality of life and environmental equity rather than
economic efficiency. 176 Moreover, over time, history has proven regulation to be
more effective in addressing and controlling pollution externalities than pure
market-based mechanisms. When federal funding initiatives failed to address
discharges from, e.g., sewage treatment plants, the CWA was amended to
specifically require secondary treatment, as well as the regulation of combined

171. Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under the Clean Water Act, 21 ELR
10528, 10541-42 (Sept. 1991). See Houck, supra note 79, at 417-24 (describing gains made in
cutting emissions into water and other media under "best available technology" approaches
currently required by the CWA, CAA, and RCRA's hazardous waste pretreatment regulations).
172. See Section I supra, discussing effects and current control methods.
173. 63 Fed. Reg. 17782, 17785, 17789 (April 10, 1998) (stating that "90 percent is a reasonable
standard to set, which is of minimal cost to the industry in that it does not require any changes to
current ship designs, subject to the clearly stated exemption for vessels that cannot safely conduct
an exchange").
174. Reeves, White Paper,supra note 2, at 67. See 64 Fed. Reg. 26672 (1999). Yet, the Coast
Guard's stated goal remains "for owners and operators to exchange 100 percent of the original
water in the ballast tank" if possible given "operating systems and physical limitations of the
vessel." 64 Fed. Reg. at 26677.
175. See Reeves, White Paper,supra note 2, at 109-I1.
176. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 99, at 743; M. SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE
EARTH (1988); Breger, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, ProvidingEconomic Incentives in
EnvironmentalRegulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463,481-82 (1991).
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stormwater overflows. Finally, significant progress occurred. 177
Of course, programs based on either technology-based controls or economic
incentives involve a substantial governmental role of some kind and result in
economic impacts. 178 However, in comparison, economic initiatives generally
suffer a variety of deficiencies, even though economic approaches like that
suggested by the White Paper, in keeping with the recent hue and cry for
regulatory reform, 179 have 8 found favor in both academia' 80 and federal executive
and legislative initiatives.'
Proponents of economic approaches themselves understate the difficulties of
estimating costs and benefits.
In particular, the marketplace generally
underestimates ecological benefits or values.' 82 In Ohio v. Department of
Interior, 183 regulations for the assessment of natural resource damages were
invalidated because the assessment methodology relied too heavily on market or
"use" value of the lost or damaged resource. There, the D.C. Circuit noted that
177. See CWA §§ 304(b)(2), 402(p), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(b)(2), 1342(p). See generally
Valentina 0. Okaru, Financing Publicly Owned Treatment Works and Instituting Enforcement
Measures Against Non-Compliant Works Under The Clean Water Act, 2 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 213
(1994). Federal funding is still a component of the publicly owned treatment works (POTW)
program, but before obtaining funds, "the applicant for a federal construction grant must show that
its project is the most economical means of meeting effluent and water quality goals in a specific
geographic area." G. Nelson Smith, III, Lawmaker as Lawbreaker: Enforcement Actions Against
Municipalitiesfor Failingto Comply With the Clean Water Act, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 685. 700701 (1993) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1311(i) (1988)).
178. David M. Dreisen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?, 55 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 289, 293 (1998).
179. Regulatory reform has gained renewed interest and vigor since the 104th Congress took its
seat in 1994, but it had its supporters in earlier years as well, in particular, the Reagan
Administration. See Thomas 0. McGarity, RegulatoryAnalysis and Regulatory Reform, 65 TEX.
L.R. 1243 (1987). Similarly, although cost-benefit analysis has played a significant role in
environmental regulations since the early 1980's, see id., it has become "even more significant"
based in part on the principles of the 104th Congress's "Contract with America." Thompson, Yupra
note 112, at 517, citing proposed CWA Amendments of 1995, H.R. 961, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R.
9, 104th Cong. (1995). See Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
180. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 74-110 (1990); Symposium, Free Market Environmentalism: The Role of
the Market in EnvironmentalProtection, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 297 (1992).
181. See, e.g., EPA, Regulatory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27282 (May 23,
1995) (proposing "Project XL" to provide businesses greater flexibility in meeting environmental
goals); 60 Fed. Reg. 27282 (May 23, 1995) (embracing "Common Sense Initiative" to allow six
industries to develop "cleaner, cheaper, smarter" approaches to regulation). The Clinton
Administration has "jumped on the reinvention band-wagon by announcing several initiatives to
further this goal," including a proposal to extend compliance schedules for effluent standards for
companies adopting innovative approaches for pollution prevention. Paula C. Murray, Inching
Toward Environmental Regulatory Reform-ISO 14000: Much Ado About Nothing or a
Reinvention Tool?, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 35, 36 (1999) (citing BILL CLINTON & AL GORE,
REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 43 (1995)). See also Daniel A. Farber, Taking
Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance In Environmental Law, 23 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 307 (1999) (noting that the "Clinton Administration has shown particular
interest in renegotiating regulatory standards").
182. See Plater, supra note 159, at 374-77, 379.
183. Ohio v. Dep't of Interior, 880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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Interior had "made no claim" that "use value" would in fact pay for restoration,
replacement or acquisition of equivalent resources, as required by the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Recovery Act
(CERCLA), 8 4 indeed, "Interior could not possibly maintain that recovering $15
release would enable the
per pelt for the fur seals killed by a hazardous substance
5
purchase of an 'equivalent' number of fur seals."'1
As for implementation costs, economic incentive programs, be they tax-based
or otherwise, could be equally, or even more, expensive than a technology-based
regulatory program. Regulatory strategies are generally less expensive to
monitor and enforce because inspectors need only determine whether the
18 6
required technology has been installed and is being properly operated.
Conversely, economic approaches provide incentives to hide emissions or
discharges to avoid the taxes or maximize subsidies. 8 7 Inspectors would be
required to monitor the amount of pollution emitted from all possible discharge
points on a continuous basis under a18 pollution tax or subsidy scheme, an
expensive and labor-intensive endeavor.
Because there is virtually no way to calculate exactly how much abatement
will result from any given pollution tax-rate at the front-end of the taxation
program, the rate will have to be adjusted over time to meet abatement goals.
Yet, legislatures are historically unwilling to revise tax rates after they are
initially set.' 89 During the time it takes for the system to reach "steady state,"
unless society is willing to tolerate high exposure levels, proceedings to set a tax
rate will be highly contentious. Because industry tends to resist any change to
status quo, especially if immediate outlays are required implementation of an
economic incentive program is likely to be slow.'
Given the existing
uncertainties about the presence, potential for entry and severity of effects of the
next aquatic invader, the added uncertainty as to the appropriate level of taxes,
along with the attendant delays of shifting to a new program, may well be
intolerable.19 '
Critics of regulatory programs argue that industry can manipulate the
rulemaking process, and the ultimate standards chosen, by withholding data on
184. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
185. Dep't ofInterior,880 F.2d at 445.
186. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1270-71 (1985)
(regulatory programs result in decreased costs for information collection and evaluation, and
greater consistency and predictability of results).
187. See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 99, at 749.
188. See id. See also Daniel H. Cole and Peter Z. Grossman, When is Command-and-Control
Efficient? Institutions, Technology, and the Comparative Efficiency of Alternative Regulatory
Regimes for EnvironmentalProtection, 1999 Wis. L. REv. 887, 918-19 (1999) (monitoring and
enforcement costs tend to be higher for market-based programs).
189. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 99, at 748.
190. Id. at 745.
191. See Shapiro and McGarity, supra note 99, at 743. The Exotics Policy White Paperitself
acknowledges that its conclusions raise "some highly complex questions about the synergistic
interaction of taxes, subsidies, and regulatory costs in various competing segments of industry
which are beyond the analysis I can present here." Reeves, Exotic Politics,supra note 2, at 202-05.
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costly but effective abatement technologies. 192 However, EPA's authority, under
the CWA, to impose record-keeping, sampling and reporting requirements,
1 93 and
to inspect and gather data on the premises helps counteract this behavior.'
Similarly, critics believe the establishment of emission levels based on current
assessments of technology can minimize incentives for further innovation, as
industry may be reluctant to invest in researching new control methods, knowing
costs will increase as the BAT standard is ratcheted up.' 94 However, economic
initiatives, like subsidies and taxes, do not necessarily stimulate continuous
environmental improvement and may even result in less technological innovation
than comparable regulation. 95 Taxation, for example, could have the same
"chilling" effect unless it is strictly monitored, adjusted and enforced: "The
current income tax system, with its monument
to the ingenuity of tax avoidance,
96
does not inspire optimism on this point."'
Along the same lines, regulatory programs are often accused of having the
undesirable effect of rewarding older, dirtier plants through "grandfather"
provisions, providing them with a perverse incentive to continue relatively cheap
operations while placing new facilities at a disadvantage.' 97 If necessary,
however, CWA sections 301 and 402 do provide authority to force some of the
oldest, dirtiest ships to retire if they cannot meet technology-based
effluent
98
limitations, which are to be made more stringent over time.'
Moreover, it is possible to design a technology-based regulatory regime that
does not reward old, dirty facilities or vessels. For example, the Oil Pollution
192. See Reeves, White Paper, supra note 2, at 114-17; ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE & POLICY 165-67 (Brown, 2d ed. 1996)
(citing ACKERMAN & STEWART, REFORMING ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: THE DEMOCRATIC
CASE FOR MARKET INCENTIVES (1988)); Pedersen, Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15
ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 85 (1988); RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 279 (2d ed.
1977).
193. CWA § 308(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a). See Latin, supra note 186, at 1271.
194. See Dudek & Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is this Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 234-36 (1988); POSNER, supra note 192, at 279. See also Reeves,
White Paper, supra note 2, at 114 (quoting a vice president of Chrysler, discussing achievable
technology for reducing emissions, "We're all worried that if we sound hopeful, what will the
damned standards be tomorrow?").
195. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions TradingAn Economic Incentive Program?:Replacing
The Command and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 294
(1998); Cole & Grossman, supra note 188, at 892-94.
196. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 99, at 749.
197. See Reeves, White Paper, supra note 2, at 116-17; Richard B. Stewart, Controlling
Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 158 (1988)
(arguing that the more stringent treatment of new sources "encourages existing sources to prolong
their design lives and discourages new sources, with state-of-the-art water pollution technology,
from entering the market"). Perhaps in recognition of the potential for stringent BADT standards to
create incentives to keep older, dirtier facilities operating, EPA has, at least on occasion, attempted
to set BADT for new sources no higher than BAT. See Houck, supra note 171, at WL*32
(discussing litigation and reversal of petrochemical industrial standards, in Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v.
EPA, 883 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1989)).
198. See EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n., 449 U.S. 64 (1980); 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (d). See also
notes 102-103 and 125-126, supra, and accompanying text (discussing BADT and BAT
considerations).
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Act (OPA) of 1990 phases in a double hull requirement for existing vessels over
a period of twenty years, starting with the oldest, largest vessels, and requires
double hulls for all new vessels built for oil transportation when they operate in
U.S. waters or the U.S. exclusive economic zone.199 The OPA has spurred active
competition among naval architects to build a safer supertanker, and the world's
first double hull supertanker was completed in Denmark in 1992.200 In addition,
significant declines in oil spills, both in number of incidents and amounts spilled,
have occurred. °1 Meanwhile, although freight rates increased by approximately
10%,202 the flow of oil being shipped to the United States has continued with no
interruptions. 20 3 Attesting to OPA's efficacy, the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) has followed suit by adopting regulations 204
that will require

double hulls or equivalent safety features for all new oil tankers.

The final attack alleges that regulatory programs put "clean" facilities at a
competitive disadvantage. But the best performers will not necessarily be
disadvantaged under technology-based effluent limitations. Forcing the adoption

of improved technology through regulation can result not only in emission
20 5
reduction, but also, in some cases, greater efficiency and lower costs.
Implementation of the Clean Air Act (CAA) has demonstrated industry routinely
overestimates compliance costs but subsequently achieves legislative goals
without losing their competitive edge. For example, the oil industry claimed

199. See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a); 57 Fed. Reg. 36,222 (1992). For existing vessels, the double hull
requirement is phased in over several years, depending upon the size and age of the vessel,
beginning in 1995 and proceeding in stages until 2010, when all vessels over 5000 gross tons must
be equipped with double hulls. See Jeffery D. Morgan, The Oil PollutionAct of.1990: A Look at Its
Impact on the Oil Industry, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 7 (1994).
200. PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 192, at 145 (citing Hudson, Tanker Safety Plans are
Mulled as Oil Spill ThreatensShetlands, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1993 at A7B).
201. The Coast Guard reported the following data for U.S. waters: 1991 - three spills totaling
55,000 gallons (the lowest level in 14 years); 1992 - 1 spill at 98,700 gallons; 1993 - 1 spill
releasing 33,500 gallons; 1994- 1 spill at 35,700 gallons. See PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 192,
at 144.
202. See id. at 143.
203. See id. at 145 (citing Reuters, Oil Supplies Unaffected by Tanker Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
29, 1994 at D4). See 57 Fed. Reg. 1855 (1992). In fact, up until late 1999-early 2000, oil prices
were the lowest seen in decades. See ContinuingDecline in Oil PricesBenefits Consumers and a
Wide Range of Industries, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1998 at A2; Jeffrey Ball, Gasoline Price Rise
Worries Auto Makers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1999 at A2 (reporting that, although oil prices rose
somewhat during fall 1999, "[r]etail prices, adjusted for inflation, fell to their lowest level last year
since pump prices began to be tracked in 1918, according to the American Petroleum Institute").
204. See PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 192, at 145.
205. See Houck, supra note 79, at 430 n.107 (requirements for alternative technology, including
even outright bans of harmful substances, e.g., leaded gasoline and DDT, can force industry to find
alternative means of production or alternative, less destructive, products and, in doing so, save
money as well).
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phasing out lead in gasoline would cost 95% more than it actually did. 206
Pessimistic estimates of the costs of the 1990 CAA acid rain program were also
overstated by almost 50%, as emissions trading, along with CAA Title IV
restrictions, encouraged the use of low-sulfur western coal and scrubbers, and
utilities responded favorably to rewards for conservation and renewable
energy. 20 7 Also as a result of the 1990 CAA amendments, ozone-depleting CFC's
20 8
were phased-out, and ozone friendly substitutes became more widely available.
The CWA's NPDES program can actually level the playing field for
companies implementing technological controls because all facilities within 20an9
industrial class are required to meet a minimum threshold of "cleanliness.
Facilities that improve their environmental image by affirmatively adopting
innovations in technology could gain competitive advantage if their "green"
reputation is touted through effective marketing campaigns and public relations
efforts.21 0 Meanwhile, uniform standards decrease the likelihood of social
dislocation and "forum shopping" that can otherwise result from competitive
disadvantages between geographical regions or between firms in regulated
industries.
2. Using Market-Based Tools to Supplement Regulatory Requirements
Once the regulatory stage is set, technological improvement could perhaps be
encouraged through supplemental market-based incentives. 2 For example, the
1990 CAA amendments' emissions trading program shows potential because it
does not replace national air quality standards; rather, it simply provides
flexibility in reaching the predetermined
goals, i.e., the permissible levels of
2 13
exposure already set by the CAA.
206. See Alan S. Miller, EnvironmentalRegulation, TechnologicalInnovation, and TechnologyForcing, 10 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 64, 66-67 (1995); PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 192, at
168-70. Ironically, although Nixon's proposal for a stiff tax on lead additives in 1971 to encourage
their phase-out was given short-shrift by Congress at the time, the subsequent inclusion of
mandatory lead phase-out in the CAA is now touted as "the singular success story in air pollution
control." Id. at 168.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. See Reeves, White Paper,supra note 2, at 111-12, and Reeves, Exotic Politics,supra note
2, at 192 (noting that the shipping industry asked the Vancouver Harbour Master to issue a standing
order making a voluntary ballast exchange initiative into a mandatory program).
210. See Anastasios Xepapadeas & Aart de Zeeuw, EnvironmentalPolicy and Competitiveness:
The PorterHypothesis and the Composition of Capital, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 165-82
(1999).
211. See Latin, supra note 186, at 1270-71. See also Costle, 568 F.2d at 1369 (effluent
limitations imposed by NPDES permits impose minimum, uniform floors below which neither
individual nor jurisdictional efforts may sink, thereby avoiding the "race to the bottom" that would
otherwise result among jurisdictions with different requirements).
212. See Houck, supra note 79, at 428, 454 n.226-28.
213. See 40 U.S.C. § 7651b; Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 99, at 747. See also Larry B.
Parker, Robert D. Poling & John L. Moore, Clean Air Act Allowance Trading,21 ENVTL. L. 2021
(1991) (noting that emissions trading initiatives have gained momentum with respect to addressing
interstate air pollution).
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Trading initiatives in general are cost effective only in situations where
regulated facilities experience different marginal control costs, and reductions
can be made more cheaply by some than by others.21 4 Although these factors
may be present among facilities and vessels subject to the CWA, it is not clear
that a trading program could be used as a supplement to the NPDES program, or
that it would make sense with respect to vessels engaged in commercial shipping.
Unlike the CAA, effluent trading programs are not explicitly authorized by the
CWA. 215 EPA, however, construes the CWA to allow dischargers to trade

wasteload allocations as a means to implement the TMDL program for meeting

water quality standards. 216 The Clinton Administration's 1994 "Clean Water

Initiative" indicates support for trading programs, and it recommends EPA study
trading opportunities and publish additional guidance regarding possible
pollutant trades.2 17
While trading may be a viable option for meeting water quality objectives
through TMDLs, it may not be so with respect to the NPDES program. Notably,
the TMDL requirement provides a relatively close parallel to the CAA's
approach; both focus on the achievement of ambient levels of "clean" water and
air, respectively. 218 In contrast, point sources must meet technology-based
214. Alexandra Teitz, Assessing Point Source Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study in
ControllingSelenium Dischargesto the San FranciscoBay Estuary, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 79, 81-82
(1994) (noting that these factors allow a market to develop but that transaction costs can "impose
trading barriers and reduce realizable cost savings").
215. See Elise M. Fulstone, Effluent Trading: Legal Constraints on the Implementation of
Market-BasedEffluent TradingPrograms Under the Clean Water Act, 1 ENVTL. LAW. 459, 48089 (1995) (concluding that CWA amendment might be necessary before such trading would be
allowed, citing, e.g., the anti-backsliding provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)). See also Teitz, supra
note 215, at 108, 152 (concluding that CWA § 302(a)-(b), which require NPDES permits to specify
effluent limitations unless elaborate modification procedures are met, "may significantly constrain
the trading options currently available"). Fulstone recommends that Congress enact a variance
from the CWA's technology-based requirements for "qualified" participants in "qualified" point
source trading programs. Fulstone, supra,at 489.
216. See U.S. EPA, Assessment and Watershed Protection Division, Guidance for Water
Quality Decisions: The TMDL Process 51 (EPA 44014-91- 001 (Apr. 1991)). See also CWA §
303(d)(4)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(A) (effluent limitations based on TMDL may be revised if
the water quality standards will still be attained).
217. See President Clinton, Clean Water Initiative:Restoring and ProtectingAmerica's Waters
(visited Jan. 25, 2000) <http://www.epa.gov/owowwtpl/cleanwater/progress/index.html>.
The
Clean Water Initiative provides that EPA guidance: (1) "establish criteria to allow for prior
approval of trades by" the permitting and administering authorities; (2) "specify that trades shall not
violate water quality standards"; (3) "specify that where water quality standards are not met, trades
based on TMDLs may still take place"; (4) identify settings, based on models, that may
complement trading programs when on-site monitoring would be otherwise prohibitively
expensive; (5) "clarify that the anti-backsliding provision of the (Clean Water Act)... does not
prohibit trading"; and (6) authorize pretreatment trading programs. Fulstone, supra note 215, at
462 n.8. For a comparison of the costs of a German effluent trading system with the CWA's
technology-based requirements, see Thompson, supra note 112, at 538-39 (concluding that,
depending on certain variables, including how much industry spends to lobby Congress and the
regulators, effluent trading may be more cost-effective).
218. See CWA § 303(d)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)(C) (TMDLs shall be allocated to meet
water quality standards) with 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 7502(c)(2) (state implementation plans must make
"reasonable further progress" toward meeting National Ambient Air Quality Standards).
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effluent limitations under the NPDES program regardless of the quality of the
receiving water body. 219 Further, trading programs are not particularly useful
when the goal is to achieve zero discharge, because there is nothing left to trade.
As a practical matter, a ballast water effluent trading program would be
difficult to implement. While trading has worked relatively well for reducing air
emissions from stationary sources like power plants, one wonders how such a
program would apply in the context of mobile ships, flying the flags of various
nations and utilizing multiple trade routes in and through the Great Lakes. For
instance, how could a trading
program be designed to assure that exotic species
220
"hot spots" are avoided?
This is not to say that alternative economic tools, such as providing rebates for
clean ballast or taxing dirty ballast, must be universally rejected. The use of
these and other types of economic initiatives should be explored to determine
their potential for enhancing the regulatory program. 2 '
IV.

THE PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF NPDES
PERMITTING FOR VESSELS

The regulation of ballast water discharges through NPDES permits will, no
doubt, present a challenge to EPA, in part because EPA does not have the
expertise regulating ships that it does regulating industrial dischargers. As a
result, shipping companies and trade groups, accustomed to dealing with national
coast guards and port authorities, will be resistant when EPA jumps into the
existing regulatory fray.
More significantly, the challenge to ballast water regulation stems from the
fact that commercial ships transporting cargo are, by their very nature, mobile,
and not only originate from various nations but also frequently cross
jurisdictional lines. 2 2 EPA typically delegates the permitting responsibilities of
219. See CWA §§ 301(b), 304(b), 402(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(b), 1314(b), 1342(a)(1).
220. See Fulstone, supra note 215, at 462 n.109.
221. See Reeves, Exotic Politics, supra note 2, at 204-06. The potential implications of any
form of subsidy for "clean" ballast would require detailed economic consideration, given that the
construction and maintenance of the St. Lawrence Seaway is already subsidized. See id. at 205.
Moreover, in general, federal expenditures aimed at supporting the position of particular industries
should be used sparingly, only in those instances where private markets have failed, as in mass
transit, or where public needs would otherwise go unmet, as in parks and the arts, and "should be
constantly reevaluated in light of changing circumstances." CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE
NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 19 (1992), citing U.S. Congress,
Joint Economic Committee, Subsidy and Subsidy-Effect Programs of the U.S. Government, 89th
Congress, 1st Sess., 1 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1965).
222. Of course, mobility in and of itself does not prevent a discharger from being classified as a
point source. Courts have consistently held that dump trucks and bulldozers, such as those used for
depositing and spreading fill, qualify as "point sources." See United States v. Pozsgai, 999 F.2d
719 (3d Cir. 1993); Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 922 (5th
Cir.1983); Matter of Alameda County Assessor's Parcel, 672 F. Supp. 1278, 1284-85
(N.D.Cal.1987); United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 622 (E.D.Va.1983), affd, 769 F.2d 182
(4th Cir.1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). See also Concerned Area Residents
for Env't v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that vehicles used to spread
manure are point sources), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1082 (1995).
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the NPDES program tQ the states, each of which may exercise its authority over a
vessel "point source" crossing through its waters. Although states cannot dip
below the federal thresholds, each individual state can impose more stringent
controls than the effluent limitations established by EPA, so disparities in
standards are quite possible.22 3 Effective implementation of the NPDES program
for ballast water discharges will depend on cooperative efforts between Great
Lakes states, between EPA and the states, and between EPA and the Coast
Guard.
A.

Administrative difficulties

The logistical difficulties inherent in regulating vessels and their ballast water
discharges do not provide EPA with an excuse to avoid regulating altogether.
Courts have flatly rejected the notion that "administrative impossibility" justifies
a refusal to require or issue NPDES permits for categories of point source
dischargers.224 Instead, the CWA "gives EPA considerable flexibility in framing
the permit to achieve a desired reduction in pollutant discharges. The permit may
proscribe industry practices that aggravate the problem of point source
pollution.0 25 Accordingly, if necessary, EPA might opt for gross reductions in
pollutant discharges from a category of facilities or vessels, rather than engage in
the fine-tuning necessitated by individualized effluent limitations. "But this
ambitious statute is not hospitable to the concept that the appropriate response to
a difficult pollution problem is not to try at all."02
Even if EPA initially addressed the problem of ballast water discharges by
using a general or area-wide permit approach,227 performance would improve.
General permits, addressed to a class of point source discharges, at least allow for
public participation, and require EPA to focus on the problem of a region or class
of activities and to revisit the issue every five years or less.228 In comparison, an
exemption like section 122.3 "tends to become indefinite: the problem drops out
of sight, into a pool of inertia, unlikely to be recalled in the absence of crisis or a
strong political protagonist.0

223. CWA § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370; 40 C.F.R. § 122.1(f). See O'Toole, supra note 55, at 45
(discussing the Navy's difficulties in complying with disparate state standards, and noting that "no
state has yet required the permitting of a U.S. Navy ship, though individual discharges are being
increasingly challenged").
224. See Costle, 568 F.2d at 1369.
225. Id. at 1380.
226. Id. at 1380.
227. See 40 C.F.R § 122.28 (1993).
228. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1382. See, e.g., 57 Fed. Reg. 41236 (1992) (providing for general
permits for storm water discharges, requiring facilities to "implement a site-specific storm water
pollution prevention plan"; however, if storm water discharges in a particular watershed or from
particular facilities or industries are found to cause water quality problems, watershed-specific or
other individualized permits may be required).
229. Id.
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B. Inter-Agency and Inter-GovernmentalCooperation
The CWA encourages and even requires coordination between the EPA and
other federal entities, including the military and the Coast Guard, with respect to
the regulation of vessels. For example, EPA must include a condition within
permits issued to facilities that occasionally operate as transportation vessels,
requiring that their discharges comply with any applicable Coast Guard
regulations "that establish specifications
for safe transportation, handling,
230
carriage, and storage of pollutants.,
More specifically, the approach in CWA section 312 for discharges of sewage
from vessels through marine sanitation devices (MSDs) and incidental discharges
from vessels of the armed forces through marine pollution control devices
(MPCDs) provides a cooperative model for EPA and the Coast Guard. Under
section 312, EPA establishes general prohibitions and performance standards,
while the Coast Guard has enforcement authority, allowing it to board and
inspect vessels on navigable waters of the United States and execute warrants
issued by officers or courts of competent jurisdiction.2 31 However, because
section 312 is not implemented through the NPDES permit program, it is not a
complete analogy for EPA in regulating ballast water discharges from
commercial vessels, but should be looked to merely for guidance.
With respect to MSDs, EPA, in consultation with the Coast Guard, must
establish standards of performance to prevent the discharge of inadequately
treated sewage from vessels 232 and a testing and certification regime to regulate
the sale of MSDs.233 The standards, which are phased in over time for existing
vessels,234 must be consistent with maritime safety and other marine and
navigation laws and coordinated with Coast Guard standards.2 35 Commercial
vessels operating in the Great
Lakes must install MSDs that at least meet
236
secondary treatment quality.
MPCD performance standards are to be issued by EPA and the Department of
Defense (DOD), in consultation with the Coast Guard and the Secretaries of State
and Commerce. 237 The standards should mitigate adverse impacts on the marine
environment, considering the nature and environmental effects of the discharge,
the practicability and costs of the installation and use of the MPCDs, effects on
the vessel's operational capability, and applicable United States and international

230. 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(p).
231. See CWA § 312(k)-(I), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(k)-(I). Section 312 may also be enforced by a
State. Id. at (k).
232. See CWA § 312(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(b). EPA had previously been reluctant to regulate
sewage discharges from vessels due to the lack of availability of pump-out facilities. See S. REP.
95-370, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326, at *59 (July 28, 1977).
233. See CWA § 312(g)-(h), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(g)-(h).
234. See CWA § 312(c)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)(A).
235. See CWA § 312(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1).
236. See CWA § 312(c)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)(B).
237. See CWA § 312(n)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(n)(3)(A).
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law.238 Standards may reflect distinctions between classes, types and sizes of
for classes, types
vessels and may even be waived "as necessary or apropriate"
2
or sizes of vessels, as well as for individual vessels. p
Performance standards for vessels have been issued pursuant to a joint effort
by EPA, the Coast Guard, and the Departments of Defense, State, and
Commerce. 240 EPA and DOD determined that it is reasonable and practicable to
regulate discharges of ballast water through MIPCDs, 241 and current management
practices for open-ocean exchange, based on the IMO's guidelines, "demonstrate
the availability of controls 2 42
to mitigate the potential adverse environmental
impacts from this discharge.
Congress expressly preempted most state laws and regulations regarding the
design, manufacture, installation or use of MSDs or MPCDs. 2 43 Upon petition to
EPA, however, states may prohibit discharges in some or all of the waters within
the state as required for the protection and enhancement of water quality, if EPA
determines, inter alia, that adequate facilities for the safe and sanitary removal
and treatment of sewage or ballast water from vessels are reasonably available. 2 "
Looking to section 312, EPA, with Coast Guard cooperation and input, could
issue national effluent limitations for ballast water discharges from commercial
vessels, reflecting BAT through MPCDs or alternative treatment methods. EPA,
again with the Coast Guard as a consulting partner, could then issue general or

238. See CWA § 312(n)(2)-(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(n)(2)-(3). Section 312(n) applies unless the
Secretary of Defense finds that compliance "would not be in the national security interests of the
United States." Id. at (n)(1).
239. CWA § 312(c)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2).
240. See 64 Fed. Reg. 25126, 25130 (1999) (final rule); 63 Fed. Reg. 45298, 45306 (1999)
(proposed rule).
241. See id. at 45308 (defining MPCD, as used in the proposed rule, as "a control technology or
a management practice that can reasonably and practicably be installed or otherwise used on a
vessel of the Armed Forces to receive, retain, treat, control or discharge a discharge incidental to
the normal operation of the vessel.").
242. Id. at 45310-11. The Navy and Coast Guard either currently implement or are in the
process of approving a ballast water management policy requiring open-ocean ballast water
exchange, based on IMO Guidelines for Preventing the Introduction of Unwanted Aquatic
Organisms and Pathogens from Ships' Ballast Water and Sediment Discharge (May 10, 1995). See
63 Fed. Reg. at 45306. In the final rule, the agencies noted that a more detailed assessment of the
MPCD control options and performance standards for each class of vessels would be performed in
a subsequent phase of rulemaking. See 64 Fed. Reg. at 25130.
243. See CWA § 312(f)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(f)(1). States are allowed to impose more stringent
requirements for MSDs on houseboats. Id.
244. CWA § 312(f)(3)-(4), (n)(7)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1322(f)(3)-(4), (n)(7)(B).
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regional permits incorporating the effluent limitations.245 With a unified body of
standards in place, vessel owners and operators get the benefits of certainty, and
ships could be modified or designed to meet the standards, phased in to require
state-of-the-art technologies within a reasonable period of time.246
Meanwhile, states would retain a role in enforcing the limitations contained
within the permits.2' 7 However, to avoid inconsistencies from port to port, the
MSD and MPCA approach should be followed such that states could not impose
more stringent requirements or establish "no discharge" zones absent appropriate
determinations by EPA. Although states with delegated CWA enforcement
authority may be reluctant to relinquish some of that authority back to the federal
agencies, in the context of ballast water discharges, it would seem that states
have more to gain than to lose under a program of uniform national effluent
limitations.2 48
Existing statutory provisions may limit EPA's ability to approve or withdraw
only that part of a state NPDES program dealing with vessels. The gist of section
402 is that states with "adequate authority" to carry out the permit program take
over the entire program. 249 To that end, state permit programs generally must be
approved or disapproved in their entirety. 250 The CWA does, however, explicitly
245. See, e.g., Seafood General Permit, 60 Fed. Reg. 34991 (1995) (authorizing discharges from
offshore, nearshore and shore-based vessels and onshore facilities engaged in the processing of
fresh, frozen, canned, smoked, salted, and pickled seafoods; permitted discharges include
processing wastes, process disinfectants, sanitary wastewater, and other wastewaters, cooling
water, boiler water, gray water, freshwater pressure relief water, refrigeration condense, water used
to transfer seafood to a facility, and live tank water "to waters of the United States in and
contiguous to the State of Alaska, except for receiving waters excluded from coverage as protected,
special, at-risk, degraded or adjacent to a designated 'seafood processing center"'; discharges of
petroleum hydrocarbons, toxic pollutants, or other pollutants not specified in the permit are not
authorized).
246. See O'Toole, supra note 55, at 48. O'Toole concludes that "[t]he best way to ensure Navy
ship compliance is to develop a coherent body of effluent standards for application to all Navy
ships in all waters of the U.S. and on the high seas." Id. at 46. Instead of EPA enforcement,
however, he recommends that the standards be implemented through the existing command and
control structure of the Navy. Id.
247. See CWA § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
248. See O'Toole, supra note 55, at 48-49.
249. See CWA § 402(b), (c), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b), (c). To establish "adequate" permit authority,
states must insure, among other things, that their permits will (1) comply with CWA provisions
governing effluent limitations, new sources, toxic pollutants, MSDs, and ocean discharge criteria;
(2) be limited to fixed terms not exceeding five years; (3) be terminated or modified for cause; (4)
require reporting and inspection; and (5) be enforceable through civil and criminal penalties. See
id. at (b)(l)-(9). States must also insure that EPA will receive notice of permit applications, Id.
(b)(4), and that no permit will issue if the Army Corps of Engineers, after consulting with the Coast
Guard, determines that "anchorage and navigation" of navigable waters would be "substantially
impaired." Id. at (b)(6).
250. See CWA § 402(c), (n), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c), (n); See S. REP. No. 92-414, 71 (1971), U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1972, 3737, 2 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 (Committee Print compiled for the Senate Committee on Public Works
by the Library of Congress), Ser. No. 93-1, 1489 (1973). Even in delegated states, however, EPA
retains substantial review authority. Id. See EPA v. Cal. Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S.
200, 226 (1976) (citing legislative history).
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allow for partial delegation, so long as the state's partial permit program covers
major categories of point sources and is, in and of itself, a complete permit
program covering a "significant and identifiable part of the State program. ,25
Once a state program is approved, EPA can withdraw its approval if the state
fails to administer it in accordance with federal requirements.2 2 Again, Congress
intended that state programs not be piecemealed. 53 In fact, Congress rejected an
EPA proposal that section 402 be revised to permit withdrawal for categories or
classes of sources, reflecting its concern states be given maximum responsibility
for the NPDES program and EPA's review authority be restricted as much as was
consistent with its overall responsibility for assuring the CWA's national goals
are met in a timely fashion.254 In any event, EPA withdrawal is a drastic
measure, and there are significant obstacles to taking back authority: "The
procedures for withdrawal of state programs would be suitable for the
Nuremburg trials, and will be invoked only upon epochal occasions." 255 Because
ill-will, EPA and state governments
of its disruptive nature and the resulting
25 6
generally strive to avoid withdrawal.
Instead of withdrawing state NPDES programs that attempt to impose more
stringent or contradictory requirements on ballast water discharges, EPA could
take either of two less drastic steps. Assuming EPA rescinds its regulation
excluding ballast water discharges, states would have to submit to EPA for
approval of new or additional components of their programs. EPA could then
simply refuse to approve the portion of a state program dealing with vessels as a
category of discharger. 5 7
Alternatively, if a state had an approved program, EPA could veto individual
ballast water discharge permits issued by the state on the grounds that any nonuniform requirements are "outside the guidelines and requirements" of the
CWA 8 In practice, EPA's veto power is wielded with a light touch: "oversight
is an essentially state-friendly process involving a great deal more jawboning and
negotiation than adamant intrusion. 2 59 However, individual permit supervision
is less offensive to state sovereignty than withdrawal, and EPA should not be

251. See CWA § 402(n)(3)-(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(n)(3)-(4).
252. See CWA § 402(c)(3)-(4), (n), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3)-(4), (n).
253. See CWA § 402(c)(3), (d), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3), (d). These provisions have been
described as giving "all-or-nothing authority to withdraw approval of a state NPDES program."
Cal. Water Resources Bd., 426 U.S. at 226 n.39.

254. See 1 Leg. Hist. 814, 854-855, H.R. REP .NO. 92-911, at 127.
255. RODGERS, supra note 153, at 367-68 (footnote omitted).
256. See D. Brennen Keene, The Inconsistency of Virginia's Execution of the NPDES Permit
Program: The Foreclosure of Citizen Attorneys Generalfrom State and Federal Courts, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 715, 748-49 (1995).
257. Disapproval would likely be on the grounds that inconsistent state programs fail to comply
with CWA provisions governing effluent limitations. See CWA § 402(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. §
1342(b)(1).
258. See CWA § 402(d)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 123.44(c).
259. Oliver Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands Regulation:A Considerationof
Delegationof CWA § 404 and RelatedProgramsto the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1293.
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afraid to invoke its veto power in appropriate circumstances. 260 Although
Congress intended states to play a significant role in the NPDES program, it also
wanted EPA to assure uniformity and consistency by engaging in a vigorous
overview of state programs.2 6'
C. CoordinationBetween UnitedStates and Canada
Cooperation between U.S. and Canadian authorities is at least as important as
it is among U.S. federal and state agencies. EPA's regulation of exotic species
discharged in ballast water would advance the goals and policies of the U.S.Canadian Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, as amended in 1987
(GLWQA). Like the CWA, the GLWQA is intended "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of waters of the Great Lakes Basin
Ecosystem.,2 62 The focus of the GLWQA has been, however, the control of
chemical contaminants, particularly toxic pollutants.263 Although the GLWQA
imposes no specific requirements with respect to exotics, Annex 6 of the
Agreement, dealing with pollution from shipping sources, calls for studies to
determine if exotics in ballast water discharges constitute a threat to the Great
Lakes ecosystem. 2 "
Under the GLWQA, the IJC is to monitor water quality and Great Lakes
ecosystems as a whole, andprovide recommendations to the governments of the
United States and Canada.265 In this capacity, the IJC could provide a key
coordinating role in synthesizing the efforts of the EPA and the Coast Guard
under the CWA and NISA and Canadian programs under the Canadian Shipping
Act and other relevant acts.
CONCLUSION
The CWA's NPDES program is clearly applicable to ballast water discharges
from vessels. This regulatory approach advances all the advantages of a
economic incentive program listed in the White Paper.266 The NPDES program
could be implemented quickly and would result in emission reduction, and
perhaps even elimination, of contaminated ballast water discharges through

260. See RODGERS, supra note 153, § 4.26, at 385 ("Individual permit supervision is a form of
counsel quieter than a strident takeback of approved state authority... and should be invoked more
often.").
261. S. REP. NO. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4326.
See Houck & Rolland, supra note 259, at 1293, 1312.
262. Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978 (GLWQA), as amended by the Protocol of
1987, Canada and U.S., 30 U.S.T. 1383, art. II (Nov. 22, 1978).
263. Representatives of some environmental groups expressed concern that using the GLWQA
to envelop exotic species would diminish the effectiveness of the toxics program. See Reeves,
Exotic Politics,supra note 2, at 134, 194-97.
264. GLWQA, supra note 262, at Annex 6. See also, GLWQA, supra note 262, at art. IV.
265. See id. art. III, § 1(c).
266. See Reeves, White Paper,supra note 2, at 122. See also Reeves, Exotic Politics, supra
note 2, at 202-06.
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improved technology. Moreover, BAT could serve to motivate vessel owners
and operators to achieve a higher level of effectiveness by eliminating
uncertainties and preventing jurisdictional disparities.
In comparison, economic approaches, whether in the form of taxes, subsidies
or effluent trading programs, are not explicitly authorized by the CWA. Even if
implicitly allowed by law, none of these tools provides an adequate replacement
for the uniform limitations, public involvement and rigorous enforcement of the
CWA's provisions on point source discharges.

